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For this purpose, we first evaluate economic conditions of debt sustainability in the
context of the intertemporal borrowing model, the growth-cum-debt model and the gap
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insolvency condition, we analyse mechanisms whereby a debt burden becomes
unsustainable and debt forgiveness is a rationale choice for both creditors and debtors to
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expositions, we present empirical evidence as to how debt dynamics has evolved over
the last two decades in selected HIPCs and question the effectiveness of ex post debt
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1 Introduction
As the plight of low-income developing countries in the protracted debt crisis has
caught the heart of many millions, a worldwide campaign by civil society activists and
NGOs for more substantial or total debt cancellation is gathering momentum. In
response to the growing demand for effective debt relief measures, governments of G7
and multilateral lending institutions have now placed much of their credentials in the
HIPC I and II Initiatives. Indeed, by the mid-1990s, it had become clear for creditors of
official debt that repeated debt rescheduling, which has been undertaken through the
traditional forum of the Paris Club negotiations over the last two decades, was
approaching deadlock. The need for radical measures for writing off bilateral and
multilateral official debt finally surfaced as an open agenda on the negotiating table in
1996.
Can the HIPC Initiatives, unlike other previously undertaken measures, deliver a real
and durable exit option from the severe debt overhang condition for these highly
indebted poor countries? An answer to this question depends critically on whether the
initiatives are based on the sound diagnose and deeper understanding of the causes of
the debt crisis of HIPC counties in recent decades.
Naturally, such a complicated situation as the contemporary third world debt crisis
cannot be attributed to a single cause. It requires a thorough analysis of a multitude of
domestic and external factors that have compounded the current debt overhang
stalemate intractable by traditional debt relief measures. In this context, a provocative
thesis on the cause of the debt crisis and overhang, advanced by the World Bank
economist William Easterly (1999a), deserves a detailed examination from both
theoretical and empirical perspectives.
As its analytical basis, Easterly’s thesis rests on the intertemporal borrowing/lending
model. He argues that a country with an excessive debt is one with a high discount rate
against future and/or a low intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Thus, he views the
‘excessive debt’ of HIPCs as a reflection of their peculiar order of intertemporal
preference (in particular, that of the public sector), exhibiting a tendency to run-down
country assets. While interpreting the two key parameters of the model in this very
specific perspective, his analysis tends to underplay a number of other main structural
characteristics of low-income developing economies. He goes on to argue that the
granting of progressively more favourable terms of debt and the debt forgiveness
without ensuring a switch of economic policies to the ones negotiated with the donor
community, can have perverse incentive effects. These effects are said to lead both to
further debt accumulation of a similar magnitude in anticipation of debt forgiveness and
lukewarm efforts in policy reforms.
In our view, his story of HIPCs’ debt dynamics is somewhat misleading, or one-sided at
best. The objective of this paper is to examine debt dynamics of HIPCs and reveal one
of the key external conditions responsible for the protracted debt crisis facing HIPCs. It
begins with an evaluation of the theoretical basis of Easterly’s thesis. After analysing
key variables affecting HIPCs’ dynamics and sustainability of external debt, the paper
also evaluates several conceptual pitfalls of the HIPC facilities and concludes with a
proposal for a new approach to the third world debt problem.2
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 first discusses the basic features of the
intertemporal borrowing model in conjunction with other models such as the growth-
cum-debt model and the gap models, which have been widely used in the discussion of
the role of external finance for economic development. In the context of these models,
we examine the conditions of debt sustainability. Section 3 reviews other key concepts
of debt dynamics such as liquidity problem and insolvency condition. Using these
concepts, we analyse conditions under which debt burden becomes unsustainable and
debt forgiveness becomes a rational choice for both creditors and debtors to overcome
the ensued ‘debt overhang’ condition.
In the light of these theoretical expositions, Section 4 presents empirical evidence as to
how debt dynamics has evolved over the last two decades in selected HIPCs and how
effective ex post debt relief facilities have been in eliminating the debt overhang
condition. Section 5 examines the HIPC facilities and identifies some of their remaining
weaknesses as an effective mechanism for debt crisis prevention. It evaluates the debate
on the effectiveness of policy conditionality as applied in the past and the
accompanying proposal for raising aid effectiveness by applying the new ‘selectivity’
rule. Section 6 presents our proposal to use a state-contingent debt contract as an ex ante
debt relief mechanism as opposed to the prevailing ex post facilities, in order to stem
one of main conditions engendering an unsustainable debt path.
2 Models of debt and development
The intertemporal borrowing/lending model, which is used by Easterly to advance his
arguments, is an extension of the theory of intertemporal optimization behaviour of
consumer or individual asset holder to the level of a country or nation, with a two-
period budget constraint with the given levels of income, y0 and y1, and a two-period
utility function U( C 0,C 1). Thus, a country’s intertemporal utility maximization for the








In Figure 1, an intertemporal production possibility frontier (PPF) represents a trade-off
between outputs in the two periods. The point A represents autarky position, where a
country has no access to international capital markets and both producers and
consumers face the domestic interest rate r, which exceeds the world interest rate, r*.
The slope of the budget line at point A is -(1+ r), whereas that of the budget line at
points B and C is -(1 + r*). With opening up to international borrowing, two effects
emerge: i) the country can divert resources to more future production at B, as it responds
to the lower interest rate, r*; and ii) the country enjoys higher current consumption at C,
as the higher utility indifference curve through point C than the one through point A
indicates.
As Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) show, this model visually links the current account
concept and the domestic investment-saving gap, and illustrates the role of international
borrowing and lending to fill the gap. Thus, accessing the international capital market,
i.e. borrowing, allows a country to undertake the extra investment (shown by the
horizontal distance between points A an B) as well as to enjoy the extra first-period of
consumption (shown by the horizontal distance between points A and C). The sum of
the two horizontal distances (the distance between B and C) is the first-period current
account deficit that reflects its resource gap. At the same time, whilst a move from A to
C reflects trade gains due to a smoothing of the time path of consumption, further trade
gains are realized by the change in the economy’s production point from A to B.
Using this framework, Easterly (1999a) argues that a country’s borrowing behaviour is
critically influenced by the shape of its intertemporal indifference curve, which in turn
is determined by two parameters: the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the
subjective discount rate. The former measures the sensitivity of the intertemporal
consumption allocation to an interest rate change, whilst the latter indicates how much
weight the society places in aggregate on current enjoyment against one in the future.
They, in combination, are said to determine the economy’s saving and investment
schedules. Easterly characterizes HIPCs as countries with a low intertemporal elasticity
and high discount rate.
It is important to note that Easterly interprets the two parameters basically as the
society’s choice variable, arguing that a country chooses a set of ‘wrong’ economic
policies, which gives rise to a low elasticity of intertemporal substitution and high
discount rate. In particular, the government is seen as having a higher discount rate than
private agents, due to the uncertainty of tenure and lower concern for future generations
of government. Hence, in his view, firstly, a country gets into a heavily indebted
position out of its own choice. Second, these two key behavioural parameters are
assumed to be unchanged after debt relief, unless a country actually implements ‘policy
reforms’, which are packaged by the donor community in the structural adjustment
programmes (SAPs). According to his thesis, for a country which does not implement
the structural adjustment programmes in full, reduced liability through debt relief could
lead to a slower rate of asset accumulation, i.e. a lower investment rate, as it endeavours
to maintain its desired net worth as a ratio to consumption. With the constant property
of intertemporal preference, the process of debt relief and a progressive substitution of
concessional debt for a non-concessional one is seen as keeping the country perpetually
heavily indebted, as a result of the possible combination of asset decumulation and
liability accumulation.4
Thus, he predicts that the granting of debt relief without ensuring full adherence to
policy the conditionality set out by the donor community leads to negative saving and
declining investment. This effect of debt relief is supposed to be in addition to other
purported negative incentive effects, such as the delay of policy reforms in anticipation
of ‘selling’ reforms at a higher ‘price’ or the creation of a moral hazard for borrowing in
the expectation of debt forgiveness. Easterly presents a number of disparate empirical
evidences to support his thesis of ‘high discount behaviour’ as the cause of HIPCs’
misfortune against the alternative hypothesis suggesting that HIPCs became highly
indebted due to external shocks. He concludes that debt relief is futile with unchanged
long-run preferences.
However, his arguments stand on rather shaky ground, as a number of serious questions
can be raised against his methodology in both conceptual and empirical aspects.
Focusing here on the problems at the conceptual level, his treatment of the behavioural
parameters as a reflection of permanent preference order of HIPCs’, which could be
changed only by adopting SAPs, can be seriously challenged. Indeed, once the
structural characteristics of low-income economies, such as the low saving rate and high
discount rate, are duly recognized as a manifestation of their stage of economic
development rather than that of subjective preference, Easterly’s thesis would fall apart.
Economic development involves many structural changes, including a shift in these
behavioural parameters. The real issue here is why SAPs, which have been adopted as
conditionality for official aid by most of HIPCs since the mid-1980s, have not produced
the necessary structural changes.
We shall return later to this critical question raised specifically in relation to SAPs in
section 5. Here, we continue to discuss the role of external finance for economic
development in macroeconomic terms in the context of two other theoretical models,
i.e. the gap model and the growth-cum-debt model. Indeed, the idea that external
finance (or foreign savings) could fill the domestic investment-saving gap, illustrated in
the intertemporal borrowing model above, is a central discourse in the infamous gap
model. In the original gap model, the limited domestic savings capacity is regarded as a
critically binding constraint to further economic development. Based on the Harrod-
Domer growth model, which postulates economic growth to be determined by an
incremental capital-output-ratio (ICOR) and a fixed domestic savings rate, one of
critical roles of official aid or concessional loans is defined as that of filling the gap
between the low domestic saving rate and the desired investment rate in order to
achieve the growth rate.1
1 Easterly’s criticism of the financial gap model in another paper (1999b) is basically directed at the gap
model’s uncritical adoption of the assumption of the fixed relationships between key parameters as
found in the original Harrod-Domar growth model. However, as discussed in the text above, this has
been for long and widely recognized as one of the drawbacks of the model. The gap models should be
instead treated as a macroeconomic analysis of the disequilibrium adjustment process as found in
Taylor’s discussion of the three-gap model (1988 and 1991). Then they remain useful as a guide in
evaluating the role of external finance in facilitating macroeconomic adjustments. Easterly’s criticism
against gap calculations as practised at IFIs is valid and applicable to any other theoretical model,
when models are applied mechanically for practical purposes without due calibrations. It is interesting
to note that Easterly criticizes the gap models for the assumption of fixed parameters and relationships
between variables, while his own interpretation of the intertemporal borrowing model is based on the
similar assumption.5
While foreign and domestic capital are treated as homogeneous in this single gap model,
two-gap models of Chenery and Strout (1966) introduced the external trade gap as a
qualitatively separate impediment, since foreign exchange availability to meet demand
for imported goods essential for capital formation is recognized as a separate binding
constraint on growth. By further distinguishing public saving from private saving, three-
gap models, advanced by Bacha (1990), add a third fiscal constraint with a view of the
fiscal dimension of the debt crisis and the well-known trade-off between growth and
inflation because of the need of attaining fiscal equilibrium with a weak tax base and in
the absence of developed financial markets. In these models, external finance
availability (i.e. foreign flows netted out external debt service, private income transfers
and changes in foreign exchange reserves) ultimately determines the level of
investment, hence the growth rate.
In reality, three gaps identified as a separately distinguishable binding constraint in the
model do interact closely with each other endogenously to engender an economy’s
adjustment path in response to various shocks. For example, ex ante adjustments would
take place with respect to all the relevant variables and parameters in order to ensure an
ex post national income accounting identity between the foreign exchange gap and the
domestic saving-investment gaps of private and public sectors. As Maizels (1968) notes,
contrary to assumptions implied in the original gap models, the parameters should not
be considered as fixed, and ex ante domestic resource gap and ex ante foreign exchange
gap are not truly independent.
The necessary ex ante adjustments are by no means either spontaneous or painless,
whether achieved through the market mechanism or through government policies. As
Chenery and Strout (1966) emphasize, there is no automatic mechanism to equate the
gaps, and the process of closing the gaps is, in essence, a disequilibrium adjustment
process. In general, the burden of adjustment could fall on one of the variables critical
for the prospect of reaching self-sustained growth.2 Taylor (1988 and 1991) shows that
while in theory there are several mechanisms by which the gaps between the three gaps
can be closed in the wake of widened foreign resource shortfall, the growth rate is an
endogenous adjustment variable in all his eighteen case-study countries.
The high costs occurring in the disequilibrium adjustment process are often related to
structural rigidities stemming from the underdeveloped nature of economic structure. In
the case of primary commodity dependent economies, the absence of resilience and
dynamism is most acutely felt in their limited capacity to generate foreign exchange
revenues in a sustained manner. Accumulated external debt would easily impose an
additional burden on their circumscribed capacity, as foreign exchange gaps would
widen over time. Adjustment efforts can easily be undermined and continuously
impeded by exogenously driven conditions such as the terms of trade shocks.
Application of the three-gap model to SSA economies demonstrates that there is in
practice no comfortable adjustment, which would accommodate an external
disequilibrium such as the region’s 40-50 per cent deterioration in the terms of trade.
In particular, the model implies that when the supply of external finance available to a
country is limited or overly inadequate to narrow the gaps, adjustment costs in terms of
2 Chenery and Strout (1966) provide a definition of self-sustaining growth as growth at a given rate
with capital inflow limited to a specified ratio to GNP, which can be sustained without concessional
aid.6
foregone economic growth can be high. Naturally, private capital is unlikely to be
available at the time of gaps emerging in the form of macroeconomic imbalances.
Hence, a need arises for official aid assistance. Furthermore, the cost difference between
foreign aid and private capital flows can be substantial, as the rate of increase of debt
obligation over time varies widely, depending on the degree of concessionality in terms
of interest rates charged, the grace period, maturity and other terms of debt conditions.
In all cases except grants, the issue of debt sustainability poses a potential threat to
development. Naturally, debt cannot be sustainable if debt servicing is accompanied by
declining income growth and eventually by a reduction in consumption to an
unacceptable level, as discussed in section 3.
Thus, it is not surprising to find that the issue of debt sustainability was raised and
discussed in the early debt literature, which centres around the growth-cum-debt model.
In fact, the debt cycle model, a derivative of the growth-cum-debt model, can be
regarded in many respects as tracing a dynamic path generated by intertemporal
borrowing over the extended period, and hence as an extension of the intertemporal
borrowing/lending model to multiple-period. The possibility of using international
borrowing to enhance income over time in the first two stages of the debt cycle is
illustrated in Figure 2.
In Figure 2, the lower curve shows the time path of income Y and absorption A, for a
country under capital account autarky, where Y has to be equal to A throughout. In
contrast, international borrowing is seen to enhance income over time, by permitting the
level of absorption A to exceed income Y by the amount of capital inflow in the first
period. However, the country eventually has to cease borrowing and start servicing the
debt, forcing it to restrict absorption to a level lower than income. The model assumes
that so long as capital inflows finance additional productive investment in the first
period, Y grows faster than under the autarky condition, whilst maintaining absorption at
a higher level than under the capital autarky throughout.
Figure 2
The growth-cum-debt model,








Naturally, such an optimistic scenario of the growth path can be realized under very
restrictive conditions only. Earlier debt literature such as Avramovic (1964) is, however,
quite positive about the possibility of a country remaining in a capital-importing status
with a positive resource transfer for a considerably long period before growth takes off.3
The conditions for the successful realization of the income-enhancing debt strategy are
summarized in the early literature as follows:
1) additions to external debt are used for growth-enhancing productive
investment;
2) the growth rate targeted by this strategy, g*, exceeds a stable world interest
rate, r*, i.e. g*> r*.
The second generation of the growth-cum-debt model, which appeared after the debt
crisis in the 1980s (McDonald 1982; Hernandez-Cata 1988), notes the following
conditions for debt sustainability:
3) the marginal domestic savings rate, sd, should exceed the investment ratio
required by the target growth rate, I*, i.e. sd >I * , so that debt will eventually
b e g i nt od e c l i n e ;
4) the marginal product of capital, fk should exceed the cost of borrowing, i.e.
fk>r * .
The second and fourth debt sustainability conditions underscore the need for a
concessional debt facility for low-income countries, discussed above. Thus, the granting
of concessional debt has a definite economic justification in the light of the debt
sustainability condition for poorer countries, whose initial take-off requires a longer
time and the mobilization of all available resources to sustain development.
As to the first and third conditions, there has been a long-running debate on the effect of
foreign aid on saving and investment.4 It has been argued that aid is essentially a
substitute for domestic savings, in particular public savings through reduced tax efforts,
and that a large proportion of foreign aid is used to increase consumption rather than
investment.
However, the intertemporal borrowing model shown in Figure 1 illustrates that
increased consumption due to foreign aid flows would be a natural outcome of
intertemporal utility maximization. Indeed, as is explicit when the perceived role of aid
is to reduce the cost of adjustment to external shocks, one rationale behind the non-
investment uses of foreign aid is to smooth consumption over time, which is also
3 Avramovic (1964), however, warns that progression through the virtuous cycle of debt and growth is
by no means automatic and emphasizes the need to fulfil sustainability conditions presented in the text
above.
4 Interestingly, for dismissing the usefulness of the financial gap model, Easterly (1999b) treats the
following two hypotheses as predictions implied by the financial gap model: i) aid will go into
investment one for one; and ii) there will be a fixed linear relationship between growth and investment
in the short run. By testing these predictions by using very simple regression analyses, he rejects the
financial gap calculations. However, his test does not amount to a rejection of the role of financial aid
in economic development as such.8
welfare-improving. Thus, as Deaton (1989: 91) observes, ‘Saving is not only about
accumulation, but about consumption smoothing in the face of volatile incomes’.
The crux of the matter in this debate is whether or not foreign aid reduces the domestic
saving ratio, not only in the short run as a part of adjustment, but also over the
long term.5 After all, as income is a critical determinant of the saving rate, empirical
investigation should concentrate on whether or not aid has contributed to income
generation, rather than on the relationship between aid and savings. With regard to the
effect of aid on investment, it has been argued that the ‘superimposed choice’ of
technology and an investment pattern attached to the flow of foreign aid, together with
problems stemming from the fungibility of project aid and tied aid, might lower the
marginal efficiency of capital.
A large number of econometric analyses on aggregate relationships between aid, saving
and investment have produced inconclusive results so far. However, the debate on the
effect of aid on saving and investment has been very much revived in recent literature
dealing with aid effectiveness in SSA, to which we shall return again in section 5.
3 Insolvency, debt overhang and debt forgiveness
The growth-cum-debt literature reviewed above tends to concentrate on the aggregate
investment saving gap in discussing the issue of debt sustainability. In contrast, the
literature that deals with the issue of liquidity and solvency of external debt focuses
attention exclusively on the external performance of the economy in relation to debt
service obligations, as the capacity of servicing external debt becomes of paramount
importance for creditors and borrowers alike in evaluating the liquidity/solvency
condition.
For example, Simonsen (1985) presents the following model to derive a condition for
solvency.
The first basic equation describing the dynamics of foreign indebtedness is given by,
G iD D + = 
where D is the country’s net foreign debt outstanding,
i is the average nominal interest rate,
G stands for the resource gap (+) or surplus (-). (Note this definition means that
a positive resource gap represents a net capital importing position).
The equation above simply decomposes the net foreign debt increase into: i) the
interest rate payment on debt stock, iD, and ii) the nonhereditary part G.O n c eG is
treated as a well-behaved decreasing function of time and interest rate as constant, the
assumed time path of these components, shown in Figure 3, generates the three phases
5 Easterly (1999b) emphasizes that there is a moral hazard problem with giving aid on the basis of a
‘financial gap’, arguing that recipient countries will have an incentive to maintain or increase the
financial gap by low saving to get more aid. Our discussion so far provides a different perspective
altogether.9
Figure 3
The time path of the debt-cycle model
time




of the debt cycle through which a country goes from a net debtor position to a net
creditor position (i.e. from Phase I through phase III in Figure 3).
In the context of this model, the question is asked as to the condition under which a
country can be in a net borrowing position without facing an insolvency issue. To derive
the required condition, the above equation is expressed in the form of the ratio of
exports as:
()g z x i z + - = 
where z =D/X (debt/export ratio), g = G/X and x =  X /X
Then, if z is to be kept unchanged, i.e.  z = 0, we have an equation for a sustainable
resource gap as:
g=( x - i )z
which is positive for x>i . A positive value of g means that a country remains in a net
borrowing position.
Thus, we arrive at a widely accepted condition for solvency: for a country to remain
solvent, the growth rate of exports must exceed the rate of interest on its outstanding
debt, i.e., x>i . In this case, resource gaps are sustained indefinitely without pushing the
country into relative over-indebtedness.6
6 Kamel (1988) shows that if one applies a stronger solvency criterion, i.e. a country is regarded as
solvent if it can ultimately repay its debt and move into a positive net asset position, the solvency10
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Figure 4 (a) The commodity terms of trade, 1970-88
The commodity price recessions in the 1930s and 1980s
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Figure 4 (b) The commodity price recessions of the 1930s and 1980s
This solvency condition is less likely to be met in a consistent and stable manner by
low-income developing countries dependent on primary commodity exports, even if
debt is incurred in concessional terms with very low, predictable interest payment
schedules such as IDA loans. Indeed, the condition confirms the widely accepted reality
that these low-income countries would not have access to external finance offered on
non-concessional terms, which are prohibitively expensive in relation to their debt
servicing capacity. This reality justifying official public debt is ignored by Easterly
(1999a), who argues that the ‘official lenders should not keep “filling the financial gap”
in violation of prudential standards of creditworthiness’.
condition would become: x ³i and x >u. That is, export growth is higher than or at least equal to the
interest rate, and export growth is higher than import growth.11
Furthermore, it is important to note here that this approach to debt dynamics and the
solvency condition assumes that all key variables in the model follow a smooth time-path
as illustrated in Figure 3. In reality, as discussed in section 4, variables determining the
resource gaps and debt dynamics of HIPCs follow much more complicated and highly
volatile time paths. Appendix Table 1 confirms that many HIPCs continuously face an
extreme degree of volatility of key variables that engender their debt dynamics.
In the case of primary commodity exporting countries, the time path of export earnings,
which is the key variable used as a denominator in calculating the debt profile in the
model, is highly volatile and largely exogenously driven. While supply-side policies such
as exchange rate policy could increase export volume, this may lead to a decline in export
earnings through the fallacy of composition effects by dampening export prices further
(see Appendix Figure 2). Thus, reflecting high volatility and uncertainty involved in the
actual time path of exports, the debt dynamics of these countries are highly unstable—a
very different condition from the one depicted by the theoretical model above.
Maizels (1992) reveals a number of key features of the commodity price movements in
the 1970s and 1980s. As shown in Figure 4 (a),7 the 1970s were characterized by
extremely large short-term price variations with a background of a modest upward trend
in real terms. The decade is referred to as one of successive shocks to world commodity
markets, driven by fears of shortages and a more general rise in commodity prices. In
contrast, commodity prices in the 1980s showed a drastic downward trend with
relatively small annual fluctuations. His study reports several estimates, suggesting that
the general commodity terms of trade fell as much as 35 per cent between 1978-80 and
1986-88. Thus, he concludes that ‘the commodity price recession of the 1980s has been
more severe and considerably more prolonged than that of the Great Depression of the
1930s’ (Maizels 1992: 11). His statement is corroborated by the historical data,
reproduced here in Figure 4 (b).8
Figures 5 (a) and 5 (b) show that many primary commodity prices have been highly
volatile throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The scale of adjustment required has often far
exceeded the capacity of these economies to absorb volatilities through aggregate
demand management, whilst dealing with associated high uncertainty and aggregate
risks. Some commodities such as coffee, cocoa, tin, had experienced a price decline of
60-70 per cent between 1980 and 1993.
The implication of this kind of export price movement for a country’s external
performance is abundantly clear. Appendix Table 1 shows that the extremely high
volatility continues to characterize all indices throughout the 1990s, affecting external
performance of selected HIPC countries (terms of trade adjusted income, purchasing
power of exports, export/import price, volume and value indices). For several countries,
all measures for their debt payment capacity have continuously followed a sharp
deterioration. In our view, it is the ‘commodity crisis’ of this scale that offers one of the
effective explanations for the protracted debt crisis inflicting commodity dependent low-
income countries. This powerful story has been often left untold or mentioned as a
marginal contributing factor to the debt crisis.
7 The graph shows commodity price indices, which are deflated by UN index of unit values of
manufactures exported by developed market-economy countries. The graph is reproduced from
Fig.1.1 in Maizels (1992).








































The beginning of the debt crisis of poor countries in the late 1970 coincided exactly
with this ‘conveniently forgotten’ commodity crisis. A number of commodity dependent
poor countries started experiencing a series of severe liquidity crisis for debt payment in
the early 1980s. Creditors judged this condition as a temporary problem and kept
financing reluctantly by rescheduling debt through the Paris and London club
negotiations. This was an act of defensive lending so that their existing claims were paid
at least on a regular basis. Based on the diagnosis that the third world debt crisis was a
result of government dirigistre economic policy failure, creditors thought that SAPs
attached as policy conditionality would arrest the crisis situation. Despite the acceptance
of SAPs by debtor countries to gain access to official aid, their debt crises, however,13
continued to deepen, giving rise to a serious question as to whether the debtor countries
had been facing a solvency crisis rather than a liquidity crisis.
The solvency constraint for the debt dynamics is defined by Eaton (1993) as the
condition that ‘debt in any period cannot exceed the present discounted value of the
borrowing country’s stock of wealth, or future income stream’. He suggests that ‘all
sovereign borrowers are probably solvent in the sense that the discounted present value
of their national resources exceeds the value of their national debt (1993: 141).
However, as Krugman (1988) notes, in the case of sovereign debt, not all of the future
income stream can be made available to servicing debt and that some fraction of
national income represents the maximum resource transfer, which in turn reflects both
rational calculations of the cost default and internal political considerations.
Hence, Krugman points out that there is a bargaining problem between creditors, who
would like to maximize the resource transfer, and debtors who would like to minimize
it. The problem is usually compounded by the free-rider problem, as the collective
interest of creditors as a whole differs from that of any individual lender. Thus, it
becomes increasingly hard for creditors to draw a clear line between a liquidity crisis
and an insolvency crisis. The former condition, i.e. the difficulty in attracting voluntary
new borrowings to effect repayment of existing debt, arises because of an individual
lender’s doubts about the solvency of debtors, as a result of her or his low expectation
about their ability to pay.
Indeed, the debt stock has kept increasing over time despite repeated interest
amortization and progressive substitution of non-concessional debt for concessional
debt, as the debt payment capacity of low-income countries has declined over time.
Consequently, a severe debt overhang, i.e. the condition arising from an excessive
amount of debt in relation to debtor’s repayment capacity, had arrived by the late 1980s.
Debt overhang is defined as the situation where outstanding debt is so large that
investment will be inefficiently low without sizeable debt or debt service reduction
(Claessens and Diwan 1989).
Claessens and Diwan (1989) recognize two effects of the debt overhang condition: the
liquidity effects and incentive effects. The former refers to the condition in which, given
the burden of large external debt with extreme scarce liquidity around, both capital
formation and consumption reach a minimum level after years of austerity and low
income growth. The latter refers to the depressed level of both public and private
investment for future growth, as a larger share of the future income stream is expected
to be directed for resource transfer abroad. Thus, it is admitted that the two effects
combined could push highly indebted countries into a downward spiral, which would
further diminish both the debtor’s willingness/commitment and capacity for debt
payment. This is not the best outcome for creditors either, since both creditors and
debtors lose.
Since debt acts as a tax on debtors’ resources that deters profitable investment
opportunities, the debt overhang condition is usually illustrated in a debt Laffer curve
such as shown in Figure 6 (Cline 1995; Krugman 1988). The concave curve traces the
value of expected repayment as a function of debt outstanding: as outstanding debt
increases beyond the threshold level, the expected repayment begins to fall due to the
two effects discussed above. Thus, a debt relief through debt service or debt stock
reduction becomes a rational choice for both creditors and debtors, when a debtor is said14
to be on the ‘wrong side’ of the Laffer curve. For example, a reduction of debt as a
result of debt forgiveness is shown in a shift from D2 to D1 in Figure 6. In contrast, at a
lower end of outstanding debt, financing through new money would relieve the
country’s liquidity problem for some time. Thus, interestingly, a bargaining position
tilts further in favour for debt forgiveness as debt stocks increase beyond the threshold,
where the debt overhang condition begins to hit. A further right position on the Laffer
curve, a major debt stock reduction becomes the only viable solution. The more
dominant the disincentive effect of debt overhang, the stronger the case for debt
forgiveness to be made in the creditors’ own interests as well.
Figure 6
The debt relief Laffer curve
C
Source: Cline (1995: 163).
As HIPCs’ debt dynamics had evolved over the past two decades as discussed in
section 4, creditors have been finally forced to recognize this eventuality in taking the
HIPC Initiatives.
4 Debt profiles of selected HIPCs
From the empirical analysis conducted on 11 HIPC countries, of which five
representative cases9 are presented in this section, we observe the following stylized
facts:
i) Saving-investment (S-I), fiscal and foreign exchange gaps were all persistently
large in the period 1980-1998 and had, in part, been widening over time;
9 Bolivia, Chad, Ghana*, Mali, Malawi, Mozambique*, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Tanzania*, Uganda*,
Zambia* (countries marked with the asterisk are reported in this section).
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ii) Net capital transfers and grants filling these gaps were generally declining,
highly volatile and grossly insufficient for initiating a self-sustainable
investment-growth-saving cycle;
iii) External shocks, particularly in the form of persistently declining terms of
trade of HIPCs depending on the export proceeds from a small number of
primary commodities, make the sustainable accumulation process very
difficult; and
iv) As a result, external debt stocks of HIPCs had been rapidly rising over time,
with large shares of new disbursements leaving the debtor countries under the
guise of debt service on accumulated external debt. Accumulation of arrears,
debt rescheduling and debt forgiveness had so far been inadequate for reducing
accumulated debt stocks or making debtors’ position sustainable.
4.1 Saving-investment, fiscal, and foreign exchange gaps
Typically, HIPCs have extremely low domestic financing resources that they can draw
from, with gross domestic saving being constantly below the level of gross domestic
investment. Indeed, Part (c) of Appendix Figure 1 shows negative saving-investment
gaps over time for all five countries. There are a few instances when the S-I gap
narrowed over the years, but there is evidence of a widening trend over the last decade
or during recent years. The narrowed gap observed in Tanzania in the 1990s resulted
from a sharp fall in investment rather than a significant rise in domestic saving. In
general, domestic savings continued to fluctuate at extremely low levels, while
investment was sustained largely by external finance. This reflects a fundamental
feature of HIPCs, characterized by domestic mobilization of savings heavily constrained
by large shares of the population with very low levels of per capita income and
consumption, and low productivity of investment that fails to originate a sustainable
investment-growth-saving cycle. All countries considered in our sample have registered
low and volatile, or virtually zero, capacity to generate saving. In the particular case of
Mozambique and Chad, savings-to-GDP ratios were negative up to the second half of
the 1990s, suggesting that aid in the form of grants was used to sustain the minimum
level of consumption.
Part (b) of Appendix Figure 1 shows a pattern in the fiscal budgetary process. While the
domestic revenue levels of most HIPCs as a fraction of GDP were declining over time
to lower levels comparable to those of the early 1980s, Ghana and Uganda have shown
some capacity to raise domestic revenue from a wider tax base. However, in the case of
many HIPCs, fiscal data are notoriously unreliable, with large shares of aid flows often
not included in the budgetary accounts. While the series shown in Part (b) of Appendix
Figure 1 are generally drawn from IFS (2001), in the case of Mozambique such data
were missing and therefore have been extracted from the WB African Database.
Although such data would suggest that budgetary expenditure was in line with domestic
revenue over the period 1988-98, the high level of grants flowing into the country over
the same period points to the latter covering most of the country’s current and capital
expenditures.
The S-I, fiscal and foreign exchange gaps were filled by the recourse to external
finance, as evident from Part (a) of Appendix Figure 1, showing the evolution of current16
account deficits including current income transfers and grants, S-I gaps and net resource
transfers including grants. At least four common features regarding external resource
flows apply to all countries:
i) Current accounts, as defined here, were persistently negative, and there is
evidence that neither foreign exchange gap nor SI-gap are narrowing over
time. Current net resource transfers, almost exclusively from official creditors,
and grants have been covering the ensuing capital shortages. With the
exception of Tanzania and Mozambique, where gaps and corresponding net
transfers including grants have been narrowing in the period 1993-97, we
observe a tendency of foreign exchange and S-I gaps to widen over time,
particularly during the late 1990s;
ii) Official grant flows, the main source of external finance to the HIPCs, were
declining significantly during the nineties after a temporary surge in the early
years of the decade;
iii) Compared to official grants, net transfer payments played a minor role,
reflecting the fact that large shares of new disbursements were made to HIPCs
for enabling repayment of existing debt, rather than for capital accumulation or
as a cushion against external shocks. This fact is further underlined by the
more detailed debt-profiles analysis given below;
iv) The high degree of volatility of net transfers and grants, suggesting a high level
of unpredictability of countries’ development finance resources available in
years to come, reflected in new capital formation linked to the availability of
external finance rather than domestic saving, as shown in Parts (c) of
Appendix Figure 1 for the countries reviewed.
In summary, on all three fronts, gaps were persistent and mostly widening over time,
while capital inflows were channelled towards servicing of debt rather than capital
accumulation.
4.2 External shocks—deterioration of the terms of trade
With the background of such gaps, HIPCs that are dependent on the exports of a
restricted number of primary commodities,10 become highly vulnerable to any volume
or price shocks affecting their export revenues.
Parts (a) of Appendix Figure 2 show the evolution of income adjusted by terms of
trade11 and the purchasing power of exports12 since 1980. All countries experienced
either a sharp decline of these indices as in Ghana or Mozambique or a high volatility as
in other countries. For most countries, both indices had not recovered by 1998 from
10 The top three commodities represented the following percentage share of merchandise exports in
1998: Ghana (81.2%), Tanzania (37%), Uganda (68.9%), Zambia (66.9%), Mozambique (50% in
1991).
11 The terms of trade effect equals the capacity to import less exports of goods and services in constant
prices. Data are in local currency.
12 The value index of exports deflated by the import unit value index.17
previous falls. Furthermore, the downturns of these indices were sharper than the
upturns, and fluctuations were at considerably deeper levels than those already reached
by 1980. As shown in Parts (b) of Appendix Figure 2 for the individual countries, this
trend is further confirmed by the terms of trade13 worsening during the 1980s, and since
then fluctuating at the low level reached in the late 1980s (Tanzania, Uganda, Ghana) or
further falling (Zambia, Mozambique).
As shown in Parts (c) of Appendix Figure 2, unit value and volume of exports were
negatively correlated, suggesting that fallacy of composition may have affected the
export revenue of their main commodities. Highly volatile export prices partly offset
potentially higher export values stemming from larger export volumes. Adjustment
programmes designed to push export volumes to higher levels were partly undermined
by adverse terms of trade effects over time. Zambia and Mozambique show clearly the
negative price effect. Although the positive volume-effect was dominant in the case of
Uganda, Ghana and Tanzania, it contributed to an extreme volatility of export proceeds.
Year to year changes in export values were often as high as 40-50 per cent, contributing
in a determinant way to the underlying unsustainability of both current balances and
external indebtedness.
Part (d) of Appendix Figure 2 for each country shows import unit value, volume and
value of imports. Ghana and Uganda display over the 1990s an increasing capacity to
import, reflecting both rising export proceeds and policy-driven efforts to raise
investment financed by external sources. In the case of the remaining countries, imports
were as volatile as exports, underlying the tight link between export performance and
import capacity, which had not been eased by a sufficient amount of development
finance from abroad.
For countries depending almost solely on the proceeds of a few commodities exported
to the world markets, fluctuations of this magnitude represent major shocks in terms of
foregone income and foreign exchange earnings that are impossible to deal with if
contingency finance is not made immediately available. In the absence of such a
facility, the refinancing and rescheduling of debt and accumulation of arrears
represented the only mechanisms for avoiding shock-ridden debtors defaulting on debt
service falling due.
4.3 Unsustainable external debt stocks
Parts (a–d) of Appendix Figure 3 show the evolution of the debt profiles for the
countries reviewed. From Part (a) of Appendix Figure 3, which presents disbursements
of new debt, total debt service, and total net transfers, it can be seen that all countries
have shared the common trend of declining and volatile net transfers since the early
1990s. The volatility of net transfers reflects the volatility of disbursements, rather than
actual debt service, which shows a far smoother pattern. In fact, countries usually
service the debt amounts within their capacity to do so, while new disbursements widely
depend on the vagaries of donors and recipients’ readiness to accept the burden of
conditionalities attached to new loans.
13 The so-called ‘net barter’ terms of trade, defined as the ratio of the export unit value index to the
import unit value index.18
From a comparative analysis of the debt dynamics of the countries reviewed, some
significant differences clearly emerge. Ghana and Uganda, the biggest HIPC economies
in the sample, have registered higher net transfers-exports ratios over time than
Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia. Since the early 1990s, net transfers to the latter
two countries were, respectively, virtually zero or negative. In Zambia, an extreme case,
new disbursements entering the country on the one side directly exited on the other side
as the repayment of existing debt, thus actually detracting from the country’s already
scarce financial resources. Furthermore, it appears that countries receive a rather
different treatment in terms of external transfers of funds.
Parts (b) of Appendix Figure 3 for the sample countries offer a closer look at the
composition of net transfers, broken down by type of creditor and flows. In the case of
Zambia, negative net transfers have been the result of debt service of bilateral and
private public and publicly guaranteed debt in excess of new disbursements, and of
repurchases of obligations to the IMF during the 1990s. Negative net transfers were
partly offset by positive transfers from multilateral creditors.
Parts (c) of Appendix Figure 3 show how the burden of debt servicing became
unsustainable over time for most countries. For instance, in almost two decades Zambia
managed to service its debt fully only in 1980. Other years, particularly from 1987
onwards, were characterized by the accumulation of arrears and later, starting in 1990,
by rescheduling of principal and interests, largely in excess of debt actually serviced.
Clearly, debt service had been widely unsustainable for a long time before the
disbursement of new funds in excess of US$ 2.5 billion was eventually agreed (from
bilateral creditors and the IMF, after Zambia had signed a three-year ESAF programme
with the IMF). This disbursement was for servicing a part of the existing debt stock,
with priority given to the repayment of accumulated arrears of IMF-obligations.
Certainly, this did not represent the solution to Zambia’s soaring external debt stock,
which continued to fluctuate at around US$ 7 billion until 1998 (Part (d) of Appendix
Figure 3 for Zambia). More than 90 per cent of Zambia’s debt stock is owed to official
(bilateral and multilateral) creditors. There are some instances of years during which
partial payments of interest and principal falling due have been forgiven (1988 to 1994),
but the importance of such interventions was far too small to result in any significant
amelioration in the sustainability of external debt.
Another representative case of debt unsustainability is Mozambique. Similar to Zambia,
bilateral net transfers used to be positive, albeit declining during the 1980s, and turning
increasingly negative over the next decade (note the US$ 349 million debt service to
bilateral creditors in 1998). Nevertheless, during the same decade Mozambique
registered increasingly positive net transfers from multilateral creditors. The degree to
which the servicing of debt had become unsustainable particularly since 1990 is
highlighted by the large share of debt being rescheduled and accumulated into arrears in
amounts well exceeding the actual debt service paid. As a result, the burden of external
debt stock reached US$ 8 billion in 1998, without a reduction in any year during the
period 1980-98 (Part (d) of Appendix Figure 3 for Mozambique).
While Tanzania’s debt profile looks similar, Ghana and Uganda present rather different
circumstances. The debt servicing capacity of these two countries had been increasing
over time. The debt service due was largely paid, with a much lesser proportion
accumulating into arrears or being rescheduled. Nevertheless, new disbursements were
high and, in the case of Uganda, increasing over time. Since debt service by both19
countries was also rising, actual net transfers were fairly stable in the case of Uganda,
and lower and also more volatile in the case of Ghana. New disbursements originated
mainly from multilateral lenders’ structural adjustment loans. Although new debt was
increasingly contracted at concessional terms, hence raising the share of concessional
debt by 1997 to almost 80 per cent for Uganda and to approximately 67 per cent for
Ghana, total external debt stock rose to unsustainable levels over time. Uganda has been
forgiven interest payments in excess of US$ 500 million through its involvement in the
HIPC Initiative since its first launch in 1996. But its total external debt stock has never
stopped rising to ever increasing levels.
In summary, HIPCs have been suffering from the burden of a persistent and mounting
debt overhang since the mid-1980s, and have been unable—even temporarily—to
recover. Debt workouts, particularly those initiated by the Paris club creditors since the
mid-late 1980s, have been far from effective in offering these countries a permanent
solution to the problem. This is because rescheduling and forgiven debt stock involved
marginal amounts compared to the size of accumulated debt stocks. Moreover, facilities
were made available ex post, and only at a point when debtors were clearly unable to
meet debt service obligations. Both the theoretical arguments discussed in the previous
sections and the above historical analysis strongly underline the need to offer these
countries an alternative mechanism to deal with recurrent external shocks.
5 Evaluation of the HIPC Initiatives
Over the past two decades, debt relief mechanisms have evolved through several stages
from short-term nonconcessional rescheduling in the post-1982 period, and the
refinancing with new loans at more concessional terms in the Toronto and ‘enhanced’
Toronto terms, relief with some debt reductions in the Naples terms, finally to the
HIPC I Initiatives in 1996 and the enhanced HIPC II Initiatives in 1999.
Killick and Stevens (1997) present a comprehensive assessment of the traditional debt
relief mechanisms applied to low-income countries against a set of efficiency criteria in
terms of adequacy, productivity, transaction cost and transparency. In almost each
criterion listed, the pre-HIPC mechanisms were assessed inefficient. They are found to
be applying short-leash mechanisms to deal with the mounting debt problems, thus
burdened with the inadequacy of the relief provided and the need for repeated rounds of
negotiations.
Despite major efforts to alleviate the debt burden, the main debt indicators deteriorated
with a series of convulsions. The question has been raised repeatedly as to why the debt
burdens of poor countries remain so onerous. In our view, one of the answers lies in the
reluctance of the donor community to grapple effectively with commodity price shocks
or terms of trade shocks, one of the critical factors shaping debt dynamics. Killick and
Stevens (1997: 147) have made many recommendations for raising the efficiency of
debt relief measures by noting, among other things: i) provision for possible
supervention of external shocks by distinguishing between temporary vs. long-lasting
shocks; and ii) more flexible mechanisms for larger and more severe shocks.20
The HIPC Initiatives addressed many of drawbacks of the traditional debt relief
mechanisms. The new features are summarized as follows:14
i) The treadmill of repeated debt negotiations is avoided by setting up with
multilateral lenders a trust fund from contributions by the Paris Club creditors.
The use of this fund is contingent on maintaining the level of IDA lending by
the World Bank. Additional resources are also supposed to come from IMF
gold sales;
ii) Effective debt relief is, for the first time, extended to multilateral debt;
iii) Debt reduction is specifically aimed at reaching an explicit target for debt
sustainability, determined by country-specific debt sustainability analysis. The
targets were lowered progressively from the HIPC I to the HIPC II;
iv) The content of policy conditionality has been changed to include the goal of
poverty reduction, while a good track record of good performance under IMF
and World Bank-supported structural adjustment programmes firmly remains
as an eligibility criterion.
Despite significant improvements made on traditional mechanisms, the HIPC Initiatives
still contain several pitfalls. In our view, the remaining problems are of quite
fundamental nature. Unless these issues are genuinely addressed, the prevailing
optimism regarding the HIPC Initiatives’ capacity to deliver a durable exit route for the
debt burden of most of the HIPCs cannot be justified.
First, the initiatives may easily become under-funded if the debt dynamics of these
HIPCs continue to exhibit an extreme degree of volatility. In this regard, the debt
sustainability analysis conducted for forecasting future requirements for debt relief is
often based on overoptimistic scenarios regarding future debt servicing capabilities
(Killick and Stevens 1997; UNCTAD 2000a). We have made some preliminary
analyses to examine the sensitivity of the projected targets of debt serving capacity
under the HIPC Initiatives against alternative projections based on past export-growth
records as shown in Appendix Figure 4 for the HIPCs under review.15 In most cases,
the projected debt path is very close to the alternative estimates based on either the
higher end of export growth rate or the average growth rate achieved over the last two
decades. In this sense, as Martin and Alami (2001) note, these projections should be
regarded as optimistic targets rather than projections as such.
However, a more serious concern can be raised about the failure of these projections to
take into account the very high volatility continuously exhibited by the key variables
determining HIPCs’ export performance and debt servicing capacities. Thus, the
14 See Killick and Stevens (1997), Killick (2000) and UNCTAD (2000b) for a more detailed discussion
and critical assessment.
15 Projections of total debt service (TDS) to export ratios are calculated by dividing IMF TDS-
projections as published in HIPCs’ decision point documents by the initial-year balance of exports of
goods and services augmented by the growth rate of exports observed over the period 1980-98.
Average growth rate of exports is used for projecting the average scenario. Average +(-) standard
deviation/2 of historical export growth rates form the denominator for best and worse scenarios,
respectively.21
absence of sufficient provisions to deal with external shocks is one of the remaining
fundamental weaknesses of the HIPC Initiatives. The lack of financial resources to
tackle the emerging shortfalls could lead to a further trade-off in the allocation of donor
resources between aid budgets and debt relief financing.
Second, there is a considerable tension and potential contradiction between the different
components of new policy conditionality embedded in the HIPC Initiatives. With the
‘eligibility’ criteria still firmly in place, the underlying assumption of the HIPC policy
conditionality is presumably that complementarities exist between structural adjustment
programmes and additional policies aimed at poverty reduction. However, economic
literature has long recognized that the growth-poverty nexus is rather complicated, and
the pattern of economic growth and development, rather than the rate of growth per se,
has significant effects on a country’s income distribution and poverty profile. This
suggests that the ‘growth-enhancing economic policies’ of SAPs are not necessarily in
agreement with policies targeted to addressing income distribution issues and poverty
alleviation targets.
Thus, simply appending the poverty reduction strategy to the structural adjustment
programmes without due attention to this complex growth-poverty nexus can be
problematic, giving rise to internal inconsistency of the policy package. Furthermore,
PRGS country papers (poverty reduction growth strategy papers) suggest that poverty
reduction is to be achieved almost exclusively through an increase in social expenditure.
While these policy measures are undoubtedly important elements of any poverty
reduction strategy, the unfounded expectation that poverty can be reduced by applying
only these measures should not be encouraged. This is because poverty is the outcome
of economic, social and political processes and their interactions, which are mediated
through a range of institutions (World Bank 2000d). The multidimensional nature of
poverty implies that any poverty reduction strategy should include a set of long-term
strategic measures for changing institutional structures and environments.
Third, the effectiveness of the use of policy conditionality in the HIPC Initiatives should
be evaluated more carefully, in the wider context of appropriateness of SAPs to effect
the structural transformation of the HIPCs’ economies that could lead to changes in
their disadvantaged form of international linkages. In our view, the conventional way of
debating the effectiveness of policy conditionality is too inhibiting, as it is based on the
assumption that SAPs are generally appropriate for dealing with the economic problems
facing HIPCs. Furthermore, policy conditionality is seen as a means of tying the
recipient government to policy reforms designed by the donor community. Therefore,
the debate has been conducted largely from the narrow perspective of the moral hazard
problem arising from granting debt relief and foreign aid without a firm commitment to
reform programmes on the part of recipient country.
Collier (1998), for example, argues that policy conditionality attached to SAPs is faulted
on incorrect rationales given to adjustment lending. In his view, none of the three
rationales for programme lending, namely the use of aid as an incentive for reform,
financing the ‘cost of adjustment’, and ‘defensive lending’ to service external debt, are
soundly based.
In recognition of this reality, Collier proposes to redesign conditionality from
‘incentives’ based on promises for policy change to ‘selectivity’ based on retrospective
assessments of performance. That is, instead of using conditionality to induce policy22
change, Collier proposes that aid should be used to target financial flows on those
governments that have already established good policy environments. His proposal is
based on the empirical work by Burnside and Dollar (1997: 30), which suggests that
‘when good policy and aid flows happen to coincide the outcome has been very good’.
It also originates from Collier’s conviction that Africa desperately needs significant
‘role models’ within the continent. Thus, creating star performers by engineering aid
allocation in this way, he argues, would induce many non-reforming governments to
change their policies through the pressure of emulation and would result in enhanced
overall aid effectiveness.
However, Hansen and Tarp (2001) question the validity of the empirical analysis by
Burnside and Dollar, which forms the basis for the ‘selectivity’ proposal. Their
extensive literature survey, extending to three generation of models on the aid-growth
relationships, confirms that aid enhances growth through the positive effects of aid on
domestic savings in the framework of first generation studies, and on the
investment-enhancing effect of aid investigated in second generation studies.
Furthermore, their critical review of the third generation models based on the new
growth theory, which include the Burnside-Dollar study, shows that the results by
Burnside and Dollar are the odd-one out from the other three studies. While all other
three studies suggest a significant impact of aid on growth as long as the aid-to-GDP
ratio does not exceed 25 per cent or more, only the former study concludes that the
effectiveness of aid depends on economic policy. Overall, in each generation of studies,
those arguing the negative effect of aid on growth are in the minority. Hence, they
caution us strongly against basing aid allocation rules on the single-cause explanations.
We argued elsewhere (Nissanke 2000) that the ‘selectivity’ proposal in aid allocation
requires a critical examination in the light of possible consequences of adopting it on aid
distribution as well as the special roles attached to official bilateral and multilateral aid
flows in a web of global finance. While private capital flows by nature move globally in
search of higher rates of return, criteria and motivation surrounding aid distribution
have been historically much more complex (Maizels and Nissanke 1984). Noting that
‘aid is given for many different purposes and in many different forms’, Hansen and Tarp
(2001) suggest that the unresolved issue in assessing aid effectiveness is not whether aid
works, but how and whether we can make the different kinds of aid instruments at hand
work better in varying country circumstances. Furthermore, unless structural
transformation gets firmly under way, the ‘star performer’ in Africa continues to shift
from one country to another. Ghana found it difficult to maintain its status as the ‘front-
runner in adjustment’ attained in the early 1990s (Aryeetey, Harrigan and Nissanke
2000).
The ‘selectivity’ proposal should also be examined in relation to a more fundamental
question as to who defines (and how to define) good policies for country-specific
conditions. We suggest the appropriateness of the design of policy conditionality
attached to the HIPC Initiatives to be re-evaluated in this context. Stein and Nissanke
(1999) suggest that an uneasy mismatch exists between the abstract model in which
SAPs are conceived and the reality found in HIPCs. In our view, the slow progress with
SAPs in reviving HIPCs by inducing substantial changes to the structure of trade and
production has more to do with this fundamental problem of the theoretical construct,
than the weak implementing capacity of African states or institutions in carrying
through structural adjustment to its perfection and completion.23
The HIPC Initiatives are praised for being based on improved donor-recipient
relationships, that involve recipient governments and civil societies at large in drafting
and debating the poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs). However, unless genuine
debate can be extended to another component of policy conditionality, i.e. the design of
structural adjustment programmes, real ownership of economic reform programmes
cannot be in the hands of recipient countries.
Instead, given the reality that foreign aid and concessional loans are in short supply, it is
more likely that granting debt forgiveness through the HIPC facilities becomes a
convenient de facto rationing device for aid allocation on the basis of the ‘selectivity’
principle.
6 Conclusions
Our theoretical analysis and empirical examination of debt dynamics of HIPCs show
that one of the major conditions, which has made their external debt unsustainable and,
hence, given rise to the protracted debt crisis over the last two decades, is their extreme
susceptibility to large-scale external shocks such as the terms of trade effects. Above all,
there is an urgent need to reduce short-term commodity market instability through
revitalizing a comprehensive North-South programme (Maizels 1992). Debt relief
measures should be examined in this broad policy context.
Past and existing debt relief mechanisms, including the HIPC Initiatives, have failed to
pay sufficient attention to the debilitating condition facing many commodity-dependent
developing countries. In particular, the effective and flexible facility of contingency
financing to deal with external shocks on an ex ante basis has been absent. Instead,
official creditors have kept applying ex post debt relief mechanisms in response to
recurrent liquidity crises and the ensued debilitating debt overhang condition, in the
firm belief that the structural adjustment programmes attached as policy conditionality
would bring about the necessary structural transformation of these economies to
overcome this condition.
The existing contingency financing facilities at IMF such as the compensatory financing
facility (CCF) or contingency credit line (CCL) are not much help to the HIPCs. Apart
from the fact that high conditionality has historically been applied to these facilities,
CCL is not available to a country using any other facility such as PRGF. CCF is
provided on non-concessional terms, and therefore is too expensive for utilization
(Martin and Alami 2001).
In our view, it is critically important to establish genuinely flexible, state-contingent
debt relief mechanisms in order to avoid the recurrence of debt crisis, which has stalled
economic development of low-income countries for so long. Krugman (1988) suggests
that the trade-off between debt forgiveness and financing in a typical negotiation can be
improved by indexing repayment to the state of nature. His theoretical model shows that
debt relief schemes in which repayment is linked to some of measure of the state of
nature are much more efficient compared to the schemes by which repayment is linked
to ability to pay. This is because the state-contingent schemes could make a distinction
between the consequences of a debtor’s own efforts and events beyond its control.24
Although Cline (1995) dismisses Krugman’s proposal of using state-contingent
instruments as impractical on a technical ground, the recent advancement in the contract
theory field of financial economics points to a promising possibility for tackling this
technical impediment. Drawing an efficient, state contingent debt contract could be
made within our technical capability, if we invest sufficient efforts in turning this
possibility into reality. What is lacking now is the full recognition and appreciation of
one of key conditions in shaping HIPCs’ debt dynamics, and the political will and
commitment to realize this possibility.
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Appendix Table 1 Volatility indicators
Appendix Figure 1: Part (a) Saving-investment gap and current account deficit
with external flows
Part (b) Fiscal gap and official grants
Part (c) Gross domestic saving, investment
Appendix Figure 2: Part (a) Terms of trade-adjusted income and purchasing power of exports
Part (b) Terms of trade
Part (c) Export performance
Part (d) Import values and volumes
Appendix Figure 3: Part (a) Total debt service, disbursements, net transfers
Part (b) Composition of net transfers
Part (c) Actual debt service, arrears, forgiven, rescheduled
Part (d) Total external debt stock




1980-97 1980-89 1990-97 1980-97 1980-89 1990-97
Terms of trade adjusted income 63.3 31.6 94.7 43.4 22.1 62.8
Purchasing power exp. 14.9 15.9 14.1 29.0 29.5 28.9
Terms of trade 29.5 18.4 10.3 11.6 8.2 10.8
Export volume 29.7 16.5 8.6 30.7 33.6 24.2
Export unit value 21.8 17.7 13.0 16.6 14.9 10.0
Export value 22.21 17.89 18.75 39.7 33.5 30.0
Import volume 32.3 19.8 24.5 31.4 32.4 29.2
Import unit value 12.3 6.3 7.8 23.3 18.4 10.5
Import value 58.19 17.61 53.88 29.9 34.0 22.8
Ghana Malawi
1980-97 1980-89 1990-97 1980-97 1980-89 1990-97
Terms of trade adjusted income 54.1 19.8 66.5 66.7 37.2 77.4
Purchasing power exp. 103.7 98.0 28.5 18.0 14.5 20.4
Terms of trade 26.8 23.9 5.4 18.1 16.2 13.6
Export volume 83.0 92.2 27.6 18.8 14.2 10.0
Export unit value 39.3 55.9 6.9 15.0 12.8 13.7
Export value 35.9 28.3 30.7 28.7 10.1 19.7
Import volume 79.5 92.9 35.1 21.5 16.6 18.2
Import unit value 46.3 63.3 3.4 19.2 13.7 2.8
Import value 59.5 27.6 37.2 35.9 23.7 18.1
Mali Mozambique
1980-97 1980-89 1990-97 1980-97 1980-89 1990-97
Terms of trade adjusted income 45.0 16.5 74.1 63.4 40.7 73.3
Purchasing power exp. 37.7 16.5 23.0 46.0 55.0 9.5
Terms of trade 7.3 5.1 7.1 26.3 8.5 21.9
Export volume 43.7 17.6 27.0 38.8 49.2 23.7
Export unit value 11.9 12.6 8.3 18.0 9.6 22.2
Export value 46.0 22.9 21.3 40.8 55.7 11.8
Import volume 22.2 12.9 14.2 15.6 16.6 15.4
Import unit value 13.8 13.7 4.1 16.5 11.9 8.0
Import value 32.4 19.0 16.0 20.1 20.9 11.0
Rwanda Tanzania
1980-97 1980-89 1990-97 1980-97 1980-89 1990-97
Terms of trade adjusted income 56.2 69.1 42.6 – – 62.0
Purchasing power exp. 31.2 22.3 40.2 27.4 29.1 26.6
Terms of trade 25.4 29.5 19.5 17.3 10.0 4.6
Export volume 39.2 28.5 46.5 32.8 25.8 27.2
Export unit value 19.9 20.1 17.5 7.6 7.4 8.1
Export value 35.0 16.0 42.3 34.0 29.1 29.2
Import volume 29.0 17.9 36.7 18.7 23.8 11.5
Import unit value 22.7 12.5 27.6 15.7 9.5 5.5
Import value 21.8 15.1 28.1 24.2 21.4 12.9
Table continues29
Appendix Table 1 (con’t)
Uganda Zambia
1980-97 1980-89 1990-97 1980-97 1980-89 1990-97
Terms of trade adjusted income 73.7 47.9 99.1 47.3 46.3 31.9
Purchasing power exp. 50.7 46.3 56.5 32.2 27.4 21.6
Terms of trade 54.3 38.1 18.5 25.1 29.1 15.3
Export volume 54.0 20.8 51.7 19.4 14.1 15.3
Export unit value 32.6 14.5 19.2 22.8 21.9 17.9
Export value 39.2 19.3 56.9 22.2 24.9 19.5
Import volume 56.4 37.6 59.7 31.3 22.2 27.9
Import unit value 31.4 44.5 3.7 24.6 27.0 8.8
Import value 63.3 34.5 60.5 26.4 29.5 21.8
Memorandum items:
Commodity price (volatilities) 1980-97 1980-89 1990-97
Coffee 27.9 20.7 38.5
Cocoa 27.0 19.7 13.8
Cotton 18.0 18.3 17.5
Tea 18.6 23.3 9.6
Gold 18.4 19.4 6.0
Copper 24.1 26.7 12.4
Tin 42.7 30.3 6.7
Export growth (volatilities) 1980-97 1980-89 1990-97
Zambia 6.5 -2.6 2.9
Rwanda 15.1 5.3 79.9
Chad 5.5 4.7 6.1
Bolivia 2.5 3.3 1.5
Ghana 2.7 11.7 1.1
Malawi 3.4 5.7 2.2
Mali 1.3 1.5 1.3
Mozambique 3.3 -2.6 0.5
Tanzania – – 2.2
Uganda 1.7 3.4 1.2
Note: Volatility indicators are calculated as the standard deviation/mean ratio of index numbers with
base year (1990).
Terms of trade adjusted income series were converted into index numbers for matter of
comparability (1990=100).
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Part (c) Gross domestic saving, investment
Appendix Figure 1 continues31
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Part (c) Gross domestic saving, investment
Appendix Figure 1 continues32










Saving minus Investment Current Account (incl.Grants)
Total Net Transfers plus Grants Total Official Grants
















() GO f f G
Domestic Expenditure Domestic Revenue
Domestic Revenue minus Expendit Total Official Grants



















Saving minus Investment Gross Domestic Saving
Gross Domestic Investment








Part (c) Gross domestic saving, investment
Appendix Figure 1 continues33
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Part (c) Gross domestic saving, investment
Appendix Figure 1 continues34
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Part (d) Import values and volumes
Appendix Figure 2 continues36
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Part (d) Import values and volumes
Appendix Figure 2 continues37
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Part (d) Import values and volumes38
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Part (d) Import values and volumes
Appendix Figure 2 continues
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Part (d) Total external debt stock
(Appendix Figure 3 continues)
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Part (d) Total external debt stock
(Appendix Figure 3 continues)
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Part (d) Total external debt stock
(Appendix Figure 3 continues)
































Total Debt Service Total Disbursements
Net Transfers



































Multilateral PPGD Bilateral PPGD Private PPGD
Use of IMF credit Total PNGD Short-term debt
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998






























Total Debt Service(incl.IMF) Total Arrears
Total Forgiven Total Rescheduled
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998





































































Total External Debt Stock Total Change in Debt Stock

















Part (d) Total external debt stock
(Appendix Figure 3 continues)
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Part (d) Total external debt stock
APPENDIX FIGURE 4
PROJECTIONS AND SCENARIOS
IMF Projection Best Scenario
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